with the British and French armed forces, or a military that is 'condemned forever to becoming and never to being'.
The study begins by outlining the core premises of the two main theoretical approaches to German defence reform: Strategic Culture and Neorealism. The article proceeds by examining the outcome of post-Cold War German defence reforms which are disaggregated into four categories: force structures, capabilities, doctrine and finally, the institutional structures determining the capacity of the military to adapt force structures, capabilities and doctrines to ongoing operations. The article then assesses the significance of the recommendations of current reform plans for the Bundeswehr's ability to remedy its deficiencies. It finds that while the proposals of the Weise Commission include several important measures which will accelerate convergence with the reforms of its European partners, it fails to address several fundamental problems which impair the Bundeswehr's capacity to adapt to ongoing operations. The penultimate section of the article takes stock of the implications of the empirical analysis for the explanatory power of Cultural and Neorealist approaches to German defence reform. It finds that although Neorealism enjoys substantial analytical leverage in capturing the process and outcome of German defence reform, it is unable to account for the slow speed with which the Bundeswehr is converging with the reforms of its European partners. Hence the section demonstrates the utility of Neoclassical Realism in explain the timing of the Bundeswehr's convergence with the dictates of the international security environment. The article concludes by focusing on the avenues for future empirical and theoretical research on German and European defence reform.
Competing Approaches to the Sources of German Military Change: Strategic Culture versus International Structure
The theoretical literature on post-Cold War German defence reform is dominated by cultural approaches. These approaches argue that German strategic culture -rooted in the moral and military defeat of WW2 and characterised by anti-militarism and a reflexive commitment to multilateralism -is an important determinant German defence policy. 8 The concept of strategic culture emphasises the role played by cognitive paradigms within societies and the key institutions of defence and security policy-making in 'predisposing societies in general and political elites in particular to certain actions and policies over others '. 9 It is important to note that the concept of strategic culture does not posit that policy outcomes will always fully mirror German strategic culture. Instead, strategic culture acts to reduce the number of policy responses which are deemed appropriate. 10 However, the literature on German strategic culture is divided between scholars who view culture as the central independent variable explaining policy outcomes and scholars who perceive culture as an intervening variable between the pressures of the international system and domestic policy response. 11 On the one hand, Berger, Duffield and Maull argue that strategic culture forms an intervening variable that mediates, but ultimately succumbs to, pressures from the international security environment. 12 As Dalgaard-Nielsen notes of these authors: 'The changes that actually occurred in German security policy over the 1990s are thus conceived of as the result of reluctant and reactive adaptation to appease the new international expectations directed at Germany'. 13 On the other hand, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst 14 emphasise the independent impact of German strategic culture in determining the outcome of German defence reform. 15 Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst posit that Germany strategic culture led to the persistence of territorial defence as the core objective of German security policy until 2003, to the maintenance of conscription and continues to produce a defence policy that is characterised by a preference for multilateral solutions and the use of civilian rather than military instruments. 16 As Dalgaard-Nielsen notes, while external pressure is an important variable, culture forms the central variable: 'the end-point of change would be a foreign and security policy that brings external pressure into balance with the stable and fundamental beliefs that make up the core of a country's security policy culture '. 17 According to Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst, when policy change occurs, it is not so much the result of pressure from the international system, but derives predominantly from 'within security culture itself'.
18 Drawing on Gidden's 'Theory of Structuration', they argue that change is dependent upon the ability of actors within the political executive to create culture through the control of discourse. Through the use of discursive tools these actors are able to 'rise above the culture they are embedded in and actively manipulate it'.
19 Dalgaard-Nielsen emphasises the role of political entrepreneurs in manipulating culture by altering 'central' 'operational' and 'peripheral' beliefs. 20 Longhurst also emphasises the importance of 'strategic cultural agents' within the political-military elite in re-shaping culture. 21 In short, defence policy choices are contingent, not so much on objective pressure from the international system, but on the subjective values, norms and beliefs of national strategic culture and upon the role of individual agency in introducing dynamism to culture. 22 The position adopted by DalgaardNielsen and Longhurst is therefore close to the arguments of the Copenhagen School on securitization, which argues that speech acts have the ability to cause, change and found new structures of significance in social relations.
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Neorealism forms the dominant competing approach, but has received relatively little attention within the literature. 24 Neorealism argues that in a competitive 'self-help' international system, where military power forms a crucial dimension of relative power, states are compelled to maximise the effectiveness of their military instruments in dealing with conflict scenarios which are likely to arise over the short-medium term. 25 Neorealism posits that three outcomes are possible in defence reform. The first outcome is military innovation: 'the discovery of new knowledge, invention of new practises or their recombination in new forms'. 26 Military innovation is, however, associated with a high-level of risk, as should a state pursue faulty innovation (that often involves significant financial and intellectual investment) it may lead to a dramatic loss of relative power.
Defence reform may also be guided by emulation: the adoption of 'best-practice' in military affairs. While Waltz argues that states are predisposed to emulate the military reforms of the dominant power in the international system 27 , states are also keenly attuned to the successes and failures of the forces structures, doctrines and capabilities of other states in the international system. Hence states emulate not only on the basis of aggregate capabilities, but also on the basis of proven success in conflict (military 'best-practice'), thereby minimising the risk and cost of emulation. 28 The final possible outcome is policy inertia, whereby a state retains increasingly defunct military structures, capabilities and doctrines and suffers a loss in relative power. Neorealism expects that states of comparable material power, geographical location and size (such as the West European Great Powers) are subject to similar levels of 'external vulnerability' and will exhibit isomorphic policy responses in military policy, leading to convergence in force structures, doctrines and military capability procurement.
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In summary, Neorealism and the Culturalist approach to defence reform adopted by Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst differ in two main ways: on the level of analysis that should take priority and on the roles played by material and ideational variables. While Neorealism locates causal weight in variables at the systemic level, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst argue that policy is determined by domestic-level variables. Secondly, Neorealism posits that policy is determined by an objective reality rooted in the structural imperatives of the balance of power that will inevitably lead to military convergence among states of similar material power, size and geographical position. However, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Longhurst argue that defence policy is dependent upon culturally-subjective interpretations of appropriate policy responses and that military convergence should not necessarily be expected.
The following analysis will test these two approaches. It will demonstrate that rather than acting according to the dictates of the subjective beliefs of strategic culture, German defence reform is gradually beginning to mirror objective military 'best-practice' and is converging with the reforms of Britain and France. The article will highlight how the experiences of conflict in Afghanistan and pressure to conform to military 'best-practice' have fostered a modest acceleration of military isomorphism through several of the Weise Commission's proposals. These proposals will improve the Bundeswehr's capacity to adapt force structures, doctrines and capabilities to the changing operational environment. German emulation of the RMA has involved three main features. Firstly, improving the jointness 36 of the Bundeswehr and its deployability and interoperability with Alliance partners through reforms to command structures. Secondly, a shift away from the procurement of platform-based weapon systems to investment in Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) capabilities in support of networked operations and investment in the capabilities required to project power within and outside of Europe's geopolitical neighbourhood. The final pillar of German reform has involved doctrinal development that has focused on the development of thinking on the networking of forces and the implications of C2ISR capabilities for Command and Control. Germany has also made progress on doctrinal development around the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) and on Stabilisation/COIN doctrine. In this regard German defence reforms represent a case of convergence with those of its closest European partners, the British and French, whose reforms have also been characterised by a similar selective emulation of the RMA. 37 However, German emulation of the RMA and its convergence with the reforms of the other European Great Powers has been painfully slow. It was only in 2003 with the release of the Defence Policy Guidelines (VPR) that Germany abandoned territorial defence in favour of expeditionary crisis-management as the core objective of defence policy. 38 Such a delay in reform to the objectives of German defence policy was particularly remarkable when one considers that the formal shift from territorial defence to a focus on expeditionary crisismanagement was taken by the French in their defence reforms of 1994 and by the British in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1997/98. 39 The temporal delay in reform to the core objectives of German defence policy has had important implications for the Bundeswehr's ability to undertake expeditionary operations on the scale and intensity of its European partners and has led to a delayed emulation of the RMA compared to Britain and France, as the following section will highlight. The shift toward jointness and interoperability in command structures took place at a relatively early stage in the post-Cold War era in the UK. In 1996 the UK established the Permanent Joint Headquarters that draws together intelligence, logistics, planning and operational staffs and contains a rapidly-deployable in-theatre joint HQ. These changes were codified by the 1997/98 SDR that placed jointness and interoperability at the heart of force planning. 40 Similarly, French command structures were reconfigured according to the principle of modularity following the 1996 structural reforms. 41 However, the principles of jointness and interoperability have only taken centre-stage in German defence reform since the turn of the century, particularly following the 2003 VPR. An important step toward jointness was taken in 2001 with the establishment of the Operations Command in Potsdam that is responsible for coordinating all overseas deployments and through the initiation of the Response Forces Operations Command that provides a deployable force headquarters. The 2006 Defence White Paper (DWP) also created of a 35,000-strong rapid-reaction force designed for the higher-intensity 'initial-entry' stages of operations and a 75,000-strong stabilisation force, designed for low-medium intensity stabilisation/post-conflict reconstruction operations. 42 These forces were intended to deliver the capacity to field 14,000 expeditionary combat troops. 43 However, significant problems remain in German force structures. While the development of joint forces is an important step forward, the separation between forces suitable for high and low-medium intensity conflict does not reflect contemporary Stabilisation/COIN operations, in which land forces require the capability to deal with conflict that can vary in intensity at short notice. Furthermore, while the French abolished conscription in 1996, 55,000 basic and extended-service conscripts currently serve in the German military for a period of six months. 44 Not only are basic-service conscripts unavailable for deployment, but they also tie up valuable personnel and resources in training and accommodation, undermining the Bundeswehr's deployability and the pace of its transformation. 45 Furthermore, although the 2006 DWP outlined the intention of developing the capacity to deploy 14,000 troops abroad (from a total force of 245,000) in support of complex crisis-management operations, the 8,300 troops currently deployed abroad have left the Bundeswehr operating at the limits of its capability.
Deficits in Force Structures
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In contrast, the planning assumptions of the UK's 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) outline the intention to generate (from 154,000 troops) a one-off intervention force of 30,000. 47 Alternatively, the SDSR envisages the capability to simultaneously undertake an enduring (more than six months) stabilisation operation of 6,500, a non-enduring (less than six months) complex intervention of up to 2,000 personnel and a non-enduring simple intervention of up to 1,000 troops. 48 French defence planning assumptions outline the capacity (from 225,000 troops) to simultaneously deploy up to 30,000 troops in a major expeditionary operation within a period of six months and for up to one year, in addition to a 5,000 strong reserve on permanent operational alert. The 2003 VPR set several key priorities in capability procurement, notably command and control, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, strategic and tactical mobility, effective engagement, support and sustainability, and survivability and protection. 50 Germany has made some progress in these areas, including the Infantryman of the Future system that will equip frontline infantry units with state-of-the-art equipment designed to improve lethality, survivability, mobility and command and control capabilities. 51 Other key acquisitions include 53 Airbus A-400M transport aircraft which will enhance strategic mobility and the strengthening of tactical mobility through the acquisition of 134 NH-90 transport helicopters and modernisation of 40 CH-53 transport helicopters. Effective engagement is being addressed through the acquisition of 80 Tiger multi-role combat support helicopters and PUMA infantry fighting vehicles. 52 Since the late 1990s there has also been significant investment in C2ISR capabilities, including the procurement of joint, networkable radio equipment and other tactical communications capabilities as well as a joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network. 53 Despite these investments, Germany lies behind its European partners in the procurement of capabilities in support of networking. While UK forces attained an initial network-enabled capability in 2007, Germany will not reach a comparable stage until 2013. 54 Germany's expeditionary capabilities are also undermined by time delays and budget over-runs associated with key procurement programmes in support of tactical and strategic airlift, including the NH-90 helicopters and A-400M transport aircraft. Of the 80 Tiger helicopters ordered by the Army (which were planned for service in 1992) only 10 have been delivered, beginning in 2006. The Eurofighter has also suffered significant delays since the project's inception in 1979 and cost over-runs have left Germany struggling to finance the purchase of the final 37 of its 177 Eurofighters. 55 Delays in procurement are compounded by the commitment to ensuring maximum performance from capabilities, rather than pursuing the cheaper and quicker option of sacrificing 10-20 percent of performance. 56 The German Defence Ministry (BMVg) has, more recently, been considering implementing a 'spiral development model' to allow the formal consideration of introducing a capability at less than 100 percent of its potential from an early stage of project development. 57 The introduction of this model will, however, have little immediate impact on ongoing programmes. Moreover, Germany remains committed to several defence capability procurement programmes which have more relevance to Cold War conflict scenarios. Such projects include the 2005/06 acquisition of eight P3-C Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft and the procurement of two U-212 submarines in 2005-06. Seen in the context of Germany's low defence spending in comparison to Britain and France, whose higher-level of spending allows them to hedge against a broader range of less-likely future conflict scenarios, such as classic major combat operations, these projects are an expensive luxury. 58 Furthermore, the 2007 ordering of four F-125-Class expeditionary frigates is excessive, considering that their utility is questionable given the likelihood of land-based expeditionary crisis-management operations characterising short-medium term conflict scenarios. 
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Deficits in Military Capabilities
Deficits in Doctrine
German doctrinal development also lags behind that of its European partners. British and French thinking on EBO has undergone significant development since 2003. Both countries have converged around the 'Effects Based Approach to Operations' (EBAO) that recognises that it is not the nature of operations themselves which have changed, but the approach to operations. 60 British and French EBAO emphasises the importance of delivering both kinetic and non-kinetic effects and has been firmly located within the Comprehensive Approach that seeks to integrate other governmental departments, international organisations and actors from civil society into campaign planning and execution. As British and French thinking on EBAO already recognised some of the pitfalls associated with EBO (not least its emphasis on kinetic effects and highlycentralised command structures) the decline of EBO has not had such far-reaching implications for these states. EBO's decline has led to a focus on the looser notion of 'effects-based thinking' that shuns the more deterministic dimensions of EBAO, by retaining its utility in targeting closed systems and networks and provide a language of effects to assist in campaign planning and execution. 61 In contrast, the Bundeswehr's conceptual development on EBAO did not take off until 2006 and lags behind that of the UK and France. Thinking on EBAO is differentiated within the Bundeswehr. While the Air Force champions a more traditional understanding of EBO 62 , the Army is receptive only to the looser concept of 'effects-based thinking'. 63 Furthermore, Germany is awaiting NATO guidance on the implications of the decline of EBO for doctrinal development. 64 German thinking about the implications of networked capabilities for military doctrine is hampered by the slow pace of C2ISR capability procurement. Hence Germany is currently engaging with the implications of new C2 capabilities for command structures and joint multinational operations through a series of military exercises; a process that took place several years previously in Britain and France. 65 Finally, Germany also suffers from significant doctrinal deficits in Stabilisation and COIN. UK and French military doctrine exhibits a strong level of dynamism and delivers a detailed account of how to undertake Stabilisation and COIN operations. 66 By 1997 British and French army doctrine recognised the tendency for expeditionary crisis-management operations to be characterised by conflict of rapidly-varying intensity. 67 However, until its revision in 2007 German Army doctrine (Truppenfuehrung von Landstreitkraeften) separated fighting, peacesupport and humanitarian aid as distinct conflict categories. 68 German doctrine was updated in 2005 to include Guidelines for Operations against Irregular Forces, but it failed to properly integrate the kinetic and non-kinetic dimensions of military operations. 69 Hence the Bundeswehr lacks a comprehensive COIN doctrine suitable for the kind of operations the Bundeswehr has encountered in the north of Afghanistan. However an explicit COIN doctrine is now under development. 70 Furthermore, German rules of engagement under ISAF and pre-deployment training have increasingly focused on a more robust approach and the effective integration of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. 71 In summary, German doctrinal development is highly-reactive to developments in NATO and displays a strong degree of inertia.
Deficits in Military Adaptability
The Bundeswehr also suffers from deficits which impair its ability to identify military 'bestpractice' from its own operational experiences and from the experiences of other states. As a consequence the Bundeswehr has encountered difficulties in adapting force structures, doctrine and capabilities to the changing operational environment in Afghanistan.
The process of 'bottom-up' military adaptation has been hampered by the delay in developing a formalised process of lesson evaluation and implementation following military operations (the so-called 'lessons-learned process'). The British and French adopted a digitised lessons-learned system in the late 1990s. Yet it was only in 2004 that Germany established an IT system in support of lessons-learned (InfoSysEEBw) at the Bundeswehr Operations Command.
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The Operations Command acts as a 'service agnostic' institution coordinating lesson identification and implementation, deciding which service should take the lead on the analysis of an issue and, through InfoSysEEBw, checking follow-up. 73 The 2008 creation of the Operational Staff and its section for Operational Assessment has also played an important role in enhancing the Bundeswehr's capacity to adapt doctrine and capabilities to the operational environment by allowing the military to more fully exploit the potential of InfoSysEEBw. 74 The work of the Operational Staff has been supplemented by the Bundeswehr's Institute of Social Sciences that, on behalf of the Operational Staff, prepares questionnaires for commanders to be completed before, during and after deployment and that also organises workshops for commanders returning from operation. 75 The 2004 establishment of the Bundeswehr Transformation Centre (BTC) as a 'think tank' on issues of force structures, doctrine, military capabilities and concept development and experimentation (CD&E) has also bolstered the Bundeswehr's capacity to identify military 'best-practice'.
Nevertheless, several fundamental problems remain in the German process of doctrinal development and capability acquisition, which undermine the Bundeswehr's ability to identify and implement lessons from operational experience and from the observation Alliance partners' experiences. Firstly, despite the prominent role of the Leadership Academy's Working Group on Joint and Combined Operations, Germany lacks a central body like the UK's DCDC and France's Centre for Concept Development, Doctrine and Experimentation (CICDE) that can take a lead role in the development of joint military doctrine. 76 The implementation of doctrinal change involve a complex process of consultation that reduces the Bundeswehr's ability to decisively respond to challenges in the operational environment and slows the speed with which changes are integrated into pre-deployment training. 77 Furthermore, the identification of lessonslearned in the comprehensive approach has been undermined by poor communication between the Foreign Office (a key partner in ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams) and BMVg following operations. However, proposals are currently under consideration to formalise Foreign 70 Office briefings to the BMVg to help the military ensure that doctrine fully supports crossgovernment cooperation. 78 Secondly, in contrast to the UK and France, where the military is permitted a significant level of autonomy in doctrinal development and implementation, German military doctrine is subject to strong civilian control. 79 The Bundestag enjoys constitutionally-mandated powers over operational issues, including rules of engagement, command and control and riskassessment. 80 In contrast, the oversight powers of the UK Parliament extend only to the approval of a mission's mandate and the right to visit troops on deployment, while the French National Assembly enjoys the right to vote on troop deployments, but only four months after the initiation of an operation. 81 The high-level of Bundestag control has been matched by a close preoccupation of the core executive and civilian leadership of the BMVg with doctrinal development and tactical and operational issues. 82 Strong civilian control not only complicates the process of doctrinal development, but also allows party-political concerns to cloud decisionmaking on doctrine at the tactical and operational levels, fostering a significant degree of doctrinal stagnation. 83 This stagnation has been evident in the development of an explicit German COIN doctrine that has proved a particularly sensitive political issue. 84 Thirdly, German military doctrine remains classified and doctrinal development is surrounded by a culture of secrecy. Not only does classification make doctrine unavailable to Reservists, but it also places limitations on the extent to which the military is able to call upon expertise from academia and civil society. 85 Furthermore, despite the steps taken by the BTC to foster a more open environment to doctrinal and conceptual development within the Bundeswehr, it has been less successful in engaging with external actors.
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The final major impediment to adaptability lies in deficits in the process of defence capability acquisition. Like the UK and France, Germany has introduced an 'Urgent Operational Requirements' (UOR) scheme allows the acquisition of equipment for ongoing operations. The scheme allows the Services to procure equipment 'off the shelf' that costs less than €5 Million and must be deployed within 12 months. 87 The scheme has, for example, allowed the military to lease Heron 1 long-range endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles from Israel and acquire Reccelight tactical reconnaissance pods and groundwork stations for its Tornados. 88 Yet German troops continue to suffer from deficits in key areas such as force protection, for example only 70 percent of German vehicles in Afghanistan enjoy mine protection (Brune, 2010: 3) Indeed, the German UOR scheme is much more limited than that of the UK. 89 Financed by Treasury contingency funding, UK UORs are not subject to budgetary restrictions. 90 The scheme has enabled investment in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and in particular, in force protection, financing, for example, an outlay of £250 Million on 400 new Ridgeback and Mastiff fighting vehicles.
Furthermore, it is very difficult for the Bundeswehr to push through changes to the formal equipment programme following the identification of serious UORs with broader implications for ongoing procurement programmes. These difficulties derive from three key deficits in the process of capability acquisition. Firstly, poor management of the relationship between the BMVg and German and European defence industries has led to insufficient mechanisms to sanction manufacturers for late delivery. This has contributed to significant time delays and cost-over-runs in key projects, particularly cooperative projects at the European level, such as A-400M, Eurofighter and the Tiger Helicopters. 92 Political considerations, including state investment in EADS and the negative consequences for Europe's defence industry should states cancel their orders, have undermined the capacity of European states to hold EADS to account for the late delivery of the Tiger and A-400M programmes. 93 Secondly, the structuring of military input to defence planning on capability acquisition also undermines the responsiveness of the acquisition programme. The key organs responsible for taking decisions on changes to the Bundeswehr's acquisition programme are dominated by military input. These organs include the Integrated Working Group for Capability Analysis (that is responsible for translating the broader direction on capabilities provided by the 2006 DWP and Coordination Group for Transformation into major decisions on force structures, doctrine and capability procurement) and the Military Advisory Board (that has ultimate decision-making authority on major changes to projects). 94 Furthermore, the Single Service Chiefs are not subordinated to the Generalinspekteur. Consequently the individual Service Chiefs can trade-off support for their key projects, thereby promoting inertia in the capability programme. 95 Finally, the performance of the German procurement programme is undermined by the weak role of the German Federal Auditing Office (BRH). While the BRH is mandated to oversee procurement, it is only able to devote a small pool of manpower to the task. 96 Furthermore, although the Bundestag enjoys the power to approve projects costing over €25 million, its capacity to hold the Defence Minister to account for delays and cost over-runs is limited. The culture of secrecy surrounding German defence policy is not only an impediment to doctrinal adaptation, but also undermines the ability of actors from civil society and other organs of Government to hold the Bundeswehr to account in the mismanagement of defence capability acquisition. There is no information available in the public realm from either the BRH or the Bundeswehr's Armaments Division on time-slippages and budget over-runs on major defence capability procurement programmes However, poor civilian oversight of defence planning is not confined to Germany. The October 2009 Independent Review of Acquisition conducted by Bernard Gray points to significant deficiencies in UK procurement, concluding that the costs of programmes are on average 40 percent greater than planned and delivered 80 percent later than estimated. 97 The report emphasises the urgent need to reform the acquisition process to allow civilian actors to exert greater control over the Services' procurement plans. 98 Combined with the poor management of relations with industry, these deficits in the structuring of military input to defence planning in the UK have reduced the responsiveness of the procurement programme to ongoing operations by leaving a black hole of £36 Billion at the heart of the UK defence budget. 99 Consequently, while the UK's UOR scheme has allowed improvements in force protection and ISR, Britain has found it very difficult to deliver urgently-needed Chinook helicopters in support of tactical manoeuvrability in Afghanistan (of which there are only 8-10 on deployment). 100 While a decision was taken in December 2009 to provide an extra 22 Chinooks funded through base closures, cuts to the Nimrod and Tornado fleets and a reduction of 7,500 civilian BMVg staff, the order was reduced to 12 by the SDSR. 101 France, in contrast, enjoys a more efficient system of defence procurement. The French acquisition programme suffers from an average delay of only 1.5 months per year, compared to the average delay of 6 months per year in the UK and is also subject to lower cost over-runs that the UK and Germany. 102 In contrast to Germany and the UK, decision making on capability acquisition is highly-centralised and streamlined. Three staff work under the direct authority of the Defence Minister on capability acquisition: the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chief Executive of the French Armaments Agency (DGA) and the General Secretary of the Administration. 103 The French Defence Minister takes full responsibility for project delivery that is coordinated through the Ministerial Investment Board (MIB). While the Single Services are represented on the MIB, the Minister must balance the Services' competing perspectives. 104 Furthermore, in contrast to the Bundeswehr's Armaments Division and UK's Defence Equipment and Support, the DGA is composed of civilian technical experts and is therefore able to provide more objective support to the Minister. 105 Finally, in contrast to the UK and Germany, the National Assembly enjoys strong oversight powers on the defence budget through the Military Programme Law that establishes the military budget and major capability investment projects over a six year period and the Defence Minister must provide annual reports to Parliament on the cost, timing and performance of projects. 107 Secondly, by a realisation spurred by the experiences of deployment in Afghanistan, of the need to address some of the deficits in German force structures, capabilities and doctrines identified in the first section of this article, in order to ensure the Bundeswehr's relevance in expeditionary operations of rapidly-varying intensity. 108 The Commission's report was delivered in October 2010. On 7 February 2011, the BMVg State Secretary, Walther Otremba, supported by the Working Group on the Restructuring of the Bundeswehr, submitted proposals for reform of BMVg command and administrative structures based closely upon the Commission's recommendations. These proposals were intended to form the key tenets of zu Guttenberg's final reform package. 109 However, the reform process has temporarily stalled following the resignation of zu Guttenberg on 1 March 2011. The new Defence Minister, Thomas de Maziere, immediately relieved Otremba of his position and outlined his intention to 'thoroughly assess' zu Guttenberg's plans. The Weise Commission's Report remains, therefore, the likeliest basis for the future reform agenda and, as a consequence, is the focus of this section.
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The Report addresses in particular changes to force structures, command structures and the capability procurement process and goes some way to addressing the Bundeswehr's deficits. It contains two key recommendations for reforms to German force structures. Crucially, the Commission proposes a reduction of the Bundeswehr to between 180,000 and 185,000 troops, the suspension of conscription and the introduction of a voluntary, up to 23 month, civil-service that will enable young people to undertake either community service or serve in the Bundeswehr (a maximum of 15,000 posts in the Bundeswehr).
111 A 15-month minimum service period will allow recruits to undergo the necessary training to serve on overseas missions.
112 By freeing-up vital funds for investment in deployability and increasing the proportion of troops available for deployment from around to 15,000, the abolition of conscription is a critical step in furnishing Germany with the professional forces necessary for complex crisis-management operations. 113 Secondly, in recognition of the increasing tendency of operations to vary in intensity, the Commission proposes the abolition of the separation between attack, stabilisation and support forces which it notes 'have brought no benefit in our capacity to undertake operations'.
114 This is an important step toward the creation of a Bundeswehr that will be capable of conducting operations of rapidly-varying intensity.
The Commission also proposes significant reforms to command structures to reduce their complexity and enhance the efficiency of operational leadership. Firstly, the report proposes strengthening the role of the Generalinspekteur (General Inspector) who will now take ultimate responsibility for all aspects of the planning, preparation, leadership and follow-up of military operations.
115 Furthermore, the Commission points to the need to reduce the levels of hierarchy across all sections of the Bundeswehr in order to increase the transparency, simplicity and speed of decision-making processes. 116 The Commission also suggests measures to avoid overlapping responsibilities between the Services by bringing together the civil and military sections of the Ministry on the basis of function, through a reduction of the ministry from 3,000 to 1,500 posts and moving all sections of the BMVg to Berlin, thereby reducing the number of departments in the Ministry by seven. 117 The simplified Ministerial structures will see a Generalinspekteur served by eight Departments: Strategy and Planning; Deployment; Structure/Organisation/Training; Support; Personnel; Material; Budget and Accounting. In order to reduce the complexity of operational leadership, the Commission also recommends reducing the role of the Services' leadership commands in international and national operations by further strengthening the Operations Command in Potsdam. 118 If enacted, these reforms to command structures will not only deliver important savings, but will enhance the Bundeswehr's deployability by simplifying operational leadership and reducing duplication. These changes to command structures have been welcomed by key figures within the Bundeswehr responsible for coordinating the 'lessons-learned' process as an important step in enhancing the implementation of lessons-learned, due to the reduction in the number of veto-points to enacting change.
119 Proposals are also under consideration to bring together the work of the Bundeswehr's Leadership Academy, Bundeswehr Universities in Hamburg and Munich, the Centre for Inner Leadership in Koblenz, Institute for German Military History in Potsdam and BTC to create a single Defence Academy. 120 If enacted, this restructuring will streamline the analysis and follow up of lessons-learned and the identification of 'best-practice' from observation of the experiences of Alliance partners.
However, the recommendations of the Commission on reforms to German command structures do not engage with several of the fundamental problems which beset doctrinal development. Firstly, without an organisation like the CICDE and DCDC that has the power to take a lead role on joint doctrine, these changes will deliver only partial improvements to doctrinal adaptability. The Commission is also silent on problem of excessive civilian interference in doctrinal development that has, at times, fostered inertia in doctrinal development, as evidenced by the slow development of an explicit COIN doctrine. Finally, the Commission fails to address the lack of openness to critical reflection in the Bundeswehr that derives from the classification of doctrine.
The Commission also makes several recommendations for changes to the process of German capability procurement. The first central proposal is the development of a defence industrial strategy that will allow the BMVg and German and European defence industries to undertake long-term planning. 121 The Commission also proposes reform of the Procurement Organisation into an Agency for Bundeswehr Procurement and the creation of a central purchasing organisation to foster a clear delineation of responsibility in acquisition by abolishing the overlapping structures of the BMVg's Armaments Division, Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement and the IT Division.
122 Furthermore, the Commission recommends an optimisation of the procurement process, including an avoidance of maximalist project specifications and the use of off-the-shelf technology wherever possible to avoid the complexities associated with new projects.
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In addition, on 25 June 2010 a BMVg list of priority cuts to ongoing projects was leaked that seeks to deliver savings of €9.3 billion. These cuts include a reduction of the number of NH-90 helicopters from 122 to 80, a reduction of the Tiger Attack Helicopter from 80 to 40, a cancellation or sale on the open market of the remaining 37 Eurofighters and a reduction of the number of PUMA fighting vehicles from 400 to 280. 124 It has also been suggested that the Bundeswehr will sell off 13 of its A-400M planes, leaving it with 40 of the military transport aircraft. 125 While cutting the number of Eurofighters is a welcome move, the reduction of A-400M, NH-90, Tiger attack helicopters and PUMA armoured vehicles, represent significant cuts to capabilities of use to expeditionary full-spectrum land-based operations, which form the likeliest conflict scenarios for the Bundeswehr over the short-medium term. The Navy also faces 118 potential reductions in the number of frigates (from 15 to 12) through the retirement of three F122 Frigates.
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The Commission's proposals on capability procurement, if enacted, will go some way to creating a less bureaucratic and more streamlined process of acquisition by simplifying BMVg decision-making process, focusing on off-the-shelf capabilities and clarifying the Bundeswehr's requirements from the German and European defence industries. They do not, however, alter some of the fundamental problems which best the process of defence capability acquisition and reduce its responsiveness to the requirements of current missions. Firstly, unlike the Gray Review, the Commission does not explicitly recognise the negative impact of inter-service rivalry on procurement and fails to outline stronger mechanisms which will allow civilian policy makers to exert greater 'top-down' control over acquisition. Furthermore, in contrast to the highlevel of civilian control exhibited by the French procurement process, the Commission also fails to strengthen the capacity of external actors, such as the Bundestag and BRH to hold the BMVg to account for time slippages and cost-over-runs. Moreover, while the Commission recognises the need focus on off-the-shelf solutions and acknowledges the necessity for a fundamental change in cooperation between the Bundeswehr and industry, it does not propose specific measures which will allow the BMVg to exert greater control over industry in the case that projects are not delivered on time and to cost. Finally, the Commission can do little to alter the broader problem of the structural political power of the German defence industry. This problem derives from the power of individual Laender and German defence industry which reduce the willingness of the core executive to cancel or alter major projects with implications for significant German job losses.
The appointment of de Maziere provides an excellent opportunity to address some of the weaknesses in Weise Report. However, the new Defence Minister faces two further challenges. Firstly, de Maziere must convince the Finance Ministry and colleagues in the Cabinet of the need to provide sufficient finances for the reform. Despite the savings associated with the abolition of conscription, defence planners at the BMVg estimate that a professional Bundeswehr of 185,000 troops will require an extra €1.5 billion per year. 127 De Maziere also faces difficult decisions about the allocation of personnel numbers to the services and will have to make tough decisions on cuts to key capability programmes. 128 It is therefore vital that de Maziere uses the first months of his appointment to develop an explicit German National Security Strategy (NSS). The reform plans of zu Guttenberg came under fire from commentators, for undertaking a process of 'strategy formulation backwards' and were strongly criticised by the Chairwoman of the Bundestag's Defence Committee, Susanne Kastner, for placing the 'cart before the horse'. 129 The 2006 Defence White Paper is becoming increasingly outdated as a guideline for Bundeswehr reform and also offers thin guidance on the prioritisation of security threats and risks. A NSS would facilitate a more rational prioritisation of defence capability investment and allocation of 'troops-to-task' by providing unequivocal guidance to the Services on the strategic direction of reform. Furthermore, a public debate on the Bundeswehr's role in the contemporary security environment would help establish a solid foundation of public support for Bundeswehr reform and assist in securing the financing and implementation of farreaching reform.
Neoclassical Realism and the Timing of German Defence Reform: Culture as an Intervening Variable?
Germany's partial and selective emulation of the RMA provides compelling evidence that Germany is acting according to the material forces of the international system, rather than 126 subjective norms and ideas rooted in German 'security culture'. However, the slow pace of German defence reform undermines the explanatory power of Neorealism. As Waltz notes: 'The theory explains why a certain similarity of behaviour is expected from similarly situated states. The expected behaviour is similar, not identical. To explain the expected differences in national responses one would have to show how the different internal structures of states affect their policies and actions'. 130 Neoclassical Realism (NCR) has the potential to accommodate the impact of domestic variables, without sacrificing the theoretical consistency of Neorealist thought. NCR argues that while states of comparable material power, size and geographical location will exhibit military isomorphism over the long-term, they vary in their ability to extract resources from society on behalf of foreign and defence policy goals ('state power'). 131 Variable state power can lead to short-to medium-term divergence with the dictates of the international system. 132 As NCR explains the temporality of changes to national foreign, defence and security policies without diluting Neorealism's premise of the independent role played by international structure, it should, as Rathburn notes, be thought of as the 'logical and necessary' extension of Neorealism. 133 The literature on NCR is characterised by a high-level of disagreement on the variables which should take priority in determining 'state power'. NCR scholars integrate a wide array of variables which impact upon 'state power' including cognitive factors such as nationalism, ideology and culture and do not offer a fixed position on the relative impact of domestic variables endogenous or exogenous to the military. 134 Legro and Moravcsik argue that the flexibility of NCR fosters theoretical indeterminacy: 'If any government acting on the basis of geopolitical national interest, or the aims of a particular interest group, or ideationally-induced strategies, or misperceptions is in accord with realist theory, what plausible constraints on state behaviour are excluded?' 135 Yet, as Rathburn highlights, states are 'free to die'. 136 NCR can therefore, include a focus on domestic material interests/politics as well as ideational variables, as long as the theory can prove that a state is ultimately punished for deviation from structural imperatives. In this way, NCR offers possibilities for a fruitful dialogue with cultural approaches, albeit by relegating culture to the status of an intervening variable. Hence, in their emphasis on the intervening role played by German strategic culture, the contributions of scholars such as Berger, Duffield and Maull could be accommodated within NCR. 137 However, the temporality of German defence reform can be explained through a more parsimonious NCR framework that focuses not on the intervening role of cultural variables, but on domestic material power relations which constrain the autonomy of the core executive in defence policy. 138 In particular, NCR draws our attention to the impact of the Federal system in magnifying the political fall-out of base closures, due to the power of individual Laender, whose capacity to act as veto-players on base closures complicates the process of force downsizing. 139 The Federal System also plays an important role in decreasing the willingness of the core executive to make far-reaching change to capability procurement, due to presence of powerful regional politicians who lobby against the cancellation of inappropriate 'platform-based' programmes which may lead to significant regional job losses. 140 Furthermore, NCR also points to the particularly close linkages between social and budgetary policy in Germany in the form of the system of Zivildienst whereby 80-130,000 men per year undertake social work at a third of the cost of professionals. 141 However, as NCR predicts, when, following deployment in Afghanistan, compelling evidence emerged of the threat to deployability posed by stasis on conscription, it was quickly dropped from the CDU/CSU party programmes. 142 Finally, German public opinion is sensitive to the development of a more assertive and aggressive military doctrine and rules of engagement. However, it is a little simplistic to locate this sensitivity solely within the German security culture and the 'culture of anti-militarism' that took root during the post-war era. To do so neglects the malleability of culture that is as much a resource as it is a constraint in the mobilisation of society on behalf of defence, foreign and security policy goals. 143 As Morgenthau reminds us, ideas and ideology can act as 'false front behinds which the element of power, inherent in all politics, can be concealed'. 144 Drawing upon Oakshott's concept of 'character' in European politics, Hyde-Price argues that when a state is subject to particular systemic imperatives for a prolonged period of time, they create 'channels' in which political activity resides. 145 During the Cold War German defence and security policy was characterised anti-militarism and multilateralism. 146 These principles were a rational response to Germany's post-war security environment. The restrictions on German sovereignty following the Second World War placed strict limits on German freedom of action, restricting the Bundeswehr to the defence of German territory. Antimilitarism and the framing of German defence and security policy firmly within the UN and NATO were also an essential means with which to manage German rehabilitation into the international community and ensure regional and international support for German reunification. security policies, regular elections at the Land level complicate the process of reshaping the narratives underpinning German defence and security policy. 148 German policy makers were therefore forced to undertake a 'salami-slicing' approach to redefining the role of military power in German defence policy that involved regular, but limited changes to policy. 149 Within this restrictive context of low executive autonomy, German Defence Ministers attempted to manage the timing of German defence reforms. 150 Many figures within the BMVg, particularly those associated with the conduct and planning of military operations, opposed the status quo and were privately highly-dissatisfied with the tardiness of changes to German defence policy objectives, military capabilities, force structures and doctrines. 151 However, their dynamism was dampened by the civilian leadership who sought close control of the scope and pace of military transformation. 152 Promotion within the BMVg was closely tied to the willingness to support the temporal management of reform. Outspoken figures who sought to increase the pace at which the Bundeswehr was converging with the dictates of the operational environment were marginalised. 153 It is therefore possible to construct a compelling NCR account of the temporality of German defence reform without recourse to the role of culture as an intervening variable. Instead the complexities of policy implementation within a 'negotiation' democracy, have led to the temporal management of defence reform by the core executive and to slow changes to defence policy objectives, force structures, capability procurement and doctrine.
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Conclusions: Military Adaptation and Civil-Military Relations in Defence Planning
While the article challenges the findings of cultural approaches to German defence reform, it also identifies a set of theoretical and empirical research questions which require further attention. The capacity of European militaries to adapt to operational environments is a vital, yet under-explored issue. Furthermore, as Farrell notes, the theoretical literature on the sources of military change fails to adequately account for the role of 'bottom-up' military adaptation. 155 This preoccupation with 'top-down' civilian-led military change is evident in scholarship on German defence policy that focuses on the exogenous impact of strategic culture, international structure or executive autonomy. In its focus on the independent impact of international structure and the intervening impact of executive autonomy, NCR provides a strong measure of analytical leverage in understanding the key variables exogenous to the military which determine military adaptability. There is, however, a requirement for further research on the intervening impact of variables endogenous to the military in determining the 'organisational capabilities' 156 of the Bundeswehr and other European militaries to adapt force structures, capabilities and doctrines to operational requirements. Organisation theory in particular has the
